Mask of Command

The world's foremost war historian John Keegan presents an interesting take on military leadership

One of the reasons why i finally bought this book was because it partly focused on two of my favorite all-time battle commanders — Alexander the Great and the Duke of Wellington. That, and John Keegan's genius for making centuries-old battles seem increasingly relevant and significant for modern-day readers.

The book focuses on four commanders and leaders (alexander the great, arthur wellesley [duke of wellington], ulyses s. grant, adolph hitler) whose impact on history has more than compensated for their inclusion on this highly legible and surprisingly enjoyable book

Mr. Keegan postulates that throughout history, the role of commanders/leaders in conducting battles has evolved and paralleled the level of man's technogical progress (along with a host of other sociocultural, economic and ideological factors) — which he neatly labels into four types of leadership: (a) heroic, (b) anti-heroic, (c) un-heroic, (d) false heroic.

To pigeonhole his subjects into this classification, Keegan posits the question: "When conducting a battle, do you lead your men in front?" Each of the 4 possible answers — (a) always, (b) sometimes, (c) seldom, (d) never — defines a type (mask) of command/leadership.

• Thus we have alexander (Greece), who personifies the Heroic brand of leadership, always conspicuously spearheading his army's attack, because that's how he wanted to be seen and how his people expected him to behave. in this sense, the term "heroic" connotes a theatrical quality — where a leader needed to highlight his presence (via distinctive attire, brilliant oratory, rash and bold actions) to encourage and lead his men into battle. This type of leadership equates to the classic concept of a hero.

• Then, we have the Duke of Wellington (UK) who, due to advancements in weaponry (artillery), had to constantly move in and around battle scenes so as to direct how much and which of his resources (men and supplies) should be moved where and when. Much of his style (reserved and sobriety in manner, dress and speech) was in marked contrast to alexander's larger-than-life performance, hence the term Anti-Heroic. In this sense, wellington is largely viewed as an aristocrat who waged war for England and his monarch.

• Next, we have U.S. Grant (USA), who largely directed his army from the rear due to the longer range of weapons and to effectively exploit the advantages of communication (telegraph) and transportation (railroad) gears of his time. Although this may seem Unheroic in a broad sense, it was actually a practical way to fight a war in a democratic and sprawling society. Grant, who would eventually become president of the U.S., held himself no better than the men who served under him.

• Hitler, one of the 20th century's 'monsters' (both literally and figuratively) personalities, scarcely needs any explanation. Although he largely led a bunker existence for much of the war (esp. towards at the end), he would fiercely 'micromanage' many situations from the rear — much to his commanders' bitter consternation — and would repeatedly allude to his WWI experience (aided by a well-choreographed propaganda machine and his own gifts of demagoguery) to clothe himself in a 'heroic' mold (False Heroic). needless to say, among the four he could easily be seen as having ultimately failed the test of leadership.

As a parting shot, Keegan concludes that the 'mask of command' required for contemporary times (which he calls Post-Heroic) is the type of leadership that eschews warfare in favor of a rational, multipronged approach (here he cites Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis as an example). Such an approach, he hopes, would eventually render large-scale battles a thing of the past.

While this proposition seems a bit optimistic — given mankind's war-making propensities — the author presents an insightful and weighty case to promote his theory. And when one considers the bulk of his work so far, one can't help but appreciate the extent of the groundwork that he had undertaken in order to come up with this interesting theory on command and leadership.